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Dogmas of the Model Penal Code
George P. Fletcher*
The Model Penal Code has become the central
document of American criminal justice. It has had
some effect on law reform in over 35 states.' More
significantly, it provides the lingua franca of most
people who teach criminal law in the United States.
Most academics think that the precise definitions of
culpability states in section 2.02(2)2 are really neat,
and they applaud the liberal rules that restrict the
use of strict liability to administrative fines. Indeed,
all things considered, for a code drafted with almost
total indifference to what might be learned from
European models, the Model Penal Code is an impressive achievement.
The Model Penal Code's popularity is due probably to the lack of competition. Among the materials
conventionally regarded as authoritative in common
law jurisdictions, there is not much of a choice. Most
teachers have contempt for the cases that appear in
the case books. When I ask law professors to name a
case that expounds the law in a way that they admire,
they throw up their hands. In most other fields-torts,
contracts, constitutional law, even civil procedurethere are many judicial opinions that command respect. Not so in the criminal law. Nor do the existing
codes provide much solace. The adaptations of the
Model Penal Code in states like New York and Illinois
lack the conceptual integrity of the model statute. And
surely, no one would take a 19th century state code,
such as the California Criminal Code, as the model for
proper analysis.
* Cardozo Professor of Jurisprudence, Columbia University School
of Law. © 1998 by George P. Fletcher.
1. Richard G. Singer, Foreword to Symposium, The 25th Anniversary of the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 519, 519 (1988).
2. Model Penal Code § 2.02(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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One could teach criminal law on the basis of theoretical articles and books. This is the way law is
taught in all Continental jurisdictions and to a large
extent in England and Canada, but for Americans, the
use of real books to teach the law runs contrary to
tradition. Books, however good they may be, are only
secondary authority. They do not have the feel of the
"real thing." Faute de mieux, the Model Penal Code offers itself to law teachers as an elegant and coherent
alternative to the chaotic and ill-reasoned case opinions.
The downside of the Model Penal Code's influence
is that it has come to shape our understanding of
what a code should do in the field of criminal justice.
The resulting assumptions are what I call the dogmas
of the Model Penal Code. I formulate these assumptions as propositions of ironic advice to a legislature.
DOGMA I: DEFINE AS MANY CONCEPTS AS YOU CANWHETHER YOU ARE COMPETENT TO DO SO OR NOT.

The Code ventures precise definitions on matters
where many philosophers fear to tread. Nothing is
more controversial than the concept of the voluntary
action as a precondition of criminal responsibility. But
the Model Penal Code section 2.01(2)' claims it has the
answer. It merely defines what is not a voluntary act.
'
The negative list includes "a reflex or compulsion
and other such paradigmatic instances that we tend to
exclude from the category of self-actuated action. And
then section 2.01(2) sums up the exclusion with the
catch-all provision: any "bodily movement that.., is
not a product of the effort or determination of the actor, either conscious or habitual."5 Implicitly, therefore, the Code defines action as a bodily movement
produced of the will-or as willed bodily movement.
3. Id.
4. Id. § 2.01(2)(a).
5. Id. § 2.01(2)(d).
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Would that the world were so simple-that the power
to legislate were the power to solve philosophical
problems. Whether this conception of action is correct
or not proved to be one of the most hotly debated issues in German criminal law for several decades after
World War II.
The drafters of the Model Penal Code may not
have been aware that they had committed themselves
to a "causal" as opposed to a "teleological" theory of
action,6 but in fact they did. And what was the great
utility of tackling this philosophical conundrum? In
those cases in which there might be an issue of
whether, say, sleepwalking was or was not a human
action, the courts have no trouble consulting the
scholarly literature on the subject.
Or consider Model Penal Code section 2.03, which
dares to probe the mysteries of causation:
(1) Conduct is the cause of a result when:
(a) it is an antecedent but for which the result in
question would not have occurred; and
(b) the relationship between the conduct and result
satisfies any additional causal requirements 7imposed
by the Code or by the law defining the offense.
This provision, of course, does not tell you much because the problems of "proximate cause" are deferred
to other code provisions. The remaining subdivisions
of section 2.03 provide more detailed solutions for the
problem of remote damage in cases pitched to particular modes of culpability, e.g., purpose, recklessness,

6. For an explanation of the difference between these two theories
of action, see George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 434-39
(1978).
7. Model Penal Code § 2.03(1).
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etc.' Most of the stipulations end, however, with the
proviso that the defendant should be criminally liable
for remote harm only if the harm is not too remote "to
have a [just] bearing on the actor's liability or on the
gravity of his offense."9 Including the word "just" in
this proviso, of course, leaves all the difficult problems
unresolved, and therefore the attempted verbal compassing of the concept turns out to be words with little
constraining effect. The philosophical problem of causation turns out to be as difficult as the theory of action. With a stroke of the pen, legislators unequipped
for the tasks cut through shelves of books they have
never read.
One of the celebrated achievements of the Model
Penal Code is the definition of the four mental
states-purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence-in section 2.02(2). 0 These are highly complex
definitions, hardly worth repeating here. Suffice it to
say that the definitions are so complicated that one
wonders whether any judge has ever mastered them.
But even if they could be easily mastered, my objection is worth repeating. Are these matters really
within the province of legislative wisdom and authority? After all, is there one accessible truth about the
distinction between intentional and negligent conduct? Is the matter appropriately subject to legislative
will?
My doubts about legislative competence in these
areas-action, causation, and mental states-are
nourished by a glance at the 1975 German Criminal
Code. The German statute makes no effort whatsoever
to define these contested concepts. Of course, German
criminal liability presupposes a human action, just as
American law does. But the German Code drafters
saw no need to hazard a definition on a matter subject
to philosophical controversy. Similarly, with causation
8. Id. § 2.03.
9. Id. § 2.03(2)(b), (3)(b).
10. Id. § 2.02(2).
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and indeed with the concepts of intention and negligence. The German Code uses all these concepts and
specifies the consequences of causing harm or causing
it intentionally, but the text contains no definition of
these foundational elements.
Why, then, might the Model Penal Code venture
definitions where the German drafters wisely abstain?
The simple explanation is that the American approach
to the drafting of a code proceeds on the assumption
that the code must rest on its own bottom. It is not
embedded in a theoretical literature that elaborates
the essential concepts necessary for working with the
code. We might call a code of this sort imperialistic. It
seeks to displace not only the encrustation of the case
law but also the teachings of scholars. It purports to
be a comprehensive guide to the solution of the problems it addresses. Of course, the courts must apply the
code and resolve some problems in the interstices of
its provisions. Scholars are left with the residual task
of writing commentary on the code and the case law.
DOGMA II: WRITE PROVISIONS THAT SEEM PRECISE BUT
THAT JUDGES COULD NEVER UNDERSTAND.

A good example of this tendency are the provisions on culpability states already mentioned. Two
provisions that could be very simple-those on purposely and knowingly committing offenses-depend
on the subtle classification of each criminal act into
the elements of the nature of the conduct, the consequences, and the circumstances. Each of these three
categories require a different mental element for each
of the two types of culpability. In all, then, the Model
Penal Code uses four, perhaps five, different mental
attitudes to describe two forms of culpability:
1. awareness of the element
2. practical certainty of the element

8
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3. conscious object of the element
4. believes or hopes that the element exists
Needless to say that these four mental states could be
allocated to the categories of nature, consequences,
and circumstances of offenses in any number of different ways. There is nothing in the Model Penal Code to
suggest that the present allocation is rational or coherent. As a result it is very difficult to remember
which mental attitude goes with which category and
which level of culpability. I would be greatly surprised
if more than a handful of sophisticated judges actually
understood and applied these overly complex provisions.
Another example of disaster in complexity is the
definition of unlawful force in section 3.11(1). Recall
that unlawful force is a key provision in a number of
provisions on the justified use of force, particularly
self-defense, which requires that the actor reasonably
believe that the use of force is "immediately necessary" to counter the use of "unlawful force." 2
German law has a similar provision," which on its
terms is very sensible. If the other side is acting lawfully, it should be improper to resist him with the use
of defensive force. But the German Code would not
deign to define "unlawful force." Open any German
textbook and you will immediately find a clear and
straightforward explanation that unlawful force is
force that is unjustified but possibly excused. The
German Code does not define the distinction between
justification and excuse. That is something you learn
by studying criminal law.
11. Id. § 3.11(1).
12. Id. § 3.04(1).
13. 4 The German Penal Code of 1871, The American Series of Foreign Penal Codes (Gerhard 0. W. Mueller & Thomas Buergenthal
trans. 1961).
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Compare the simplicity of the German approach
with this prolix outpouring of words:
(1) "unlawful force" means force, including confinement,
which is employed without the consent of the person
against whom it is directed and the employment of which
constitutes an offense or actionable tort or would constitute such offense or tort except for a defense (such as the
absence of intent, negligence, or mental capacity; duress;
youth; or diplomatic status) not amounting to a privilege
to use the force. Assent constitutes consent, within the
meaning of this Section, whether or not it otherwise is
legally effective, except assent to the infliction of death
or serious bodily harm.14
It is almost as though the drafters wanted the Model
Penal Code to resemble a panoply of tax regulations.
Criminal codes are not written for erudite specialists.
They should be written so that average people and average lawyers and judges can understand their terms.
The fact is that this convoluted section 3.11(1)"5
says exactly the same things as the German formula:
unlawful force is unjustified but possibly excused
force. The only difference is that in the late 1950s the
drafters of the Model Penal Code could not call upon a
theoretical literature in English that would have explained these elementary points to them, and the idea
of looking abroad for guidance would have been an insult to the hegemony of American power and the
common law.
Yet this is only partly the fault of the Model Penal
Code drafters. The academic community in the United
States had done nothing to develop the conceptual
structures upon which codifiers could draft succinct
and elegant provisions. If all the academic community
does is comment on the un-wisdom of the case law, the
drafters of codes must rely entirely on their wits to
14. Model Penal Code § 3.11(1).
15. Id.
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further the progress of the law.
Section 3.11(1)16 offers us many lessons. The first
is a lesson in conceptual breakdown, which occurs
when there is insufficient attention paid to the building blocks-like justification and excuse-that are
necessary for intelligent drafting. Second, as an unduly complex and incomprehensible provision in a
model code, section 3.11(1) 17 has found adoption in
very few states. 8 The point is that if provisions in a
model code do not display their inner logic and necessity, local state drafters are likely to ignore them. This
message comes, as we shall see, with regard to other
proposals of the Model Penal Code.
DOGMA III: ASSUME THAT YOU AND YOUR DRAFTING
COMMITTEE ARE THE ONLY SMART LAWYERS WHO HAVE
EVER LIVED.
The Model Penal Code expresses contempt not
only for European thinking about criminal law but
about our own history. It does everything possible to
distance itself from the common law text writers and
the crystallization of concepts in the law of homicide
and theft. Not even the notion of intentional crime
survives. The concept is supposedly too confusing for
modern lawyers. It is better to start over with the distinction between "purposely" and "knowingly" committing an offense. The term "material elements of the
offense" is made to include the absence of all substantive defenses, which leaves the Code without a term to
refer just to the elements that constitute the core of
the prosecution's case. The Code abolishes the concept
of malice and changes the name of provocation to
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. American Law Institute, Model Penal Code and Commentaries §
3.11, at 159, cmt.1, n.5, (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985)
(citing only six states that have adopted similar definitions of unlawful
force).
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"extreme mental or emotional disturbance." As formulated by the Supreme Court in Patterson, it is perfectly sensible to think of psychological provocation
not as a denial of the prosecution's case-in-chief but as
an "affirmative defense" with the burden of persuasion on the defendant. 19
In the field of theft offenses, the Code simply
abolishes the historically crafted distinctions between
larceny and embezzlement, which gave the common
law offenses sharp edges, well designed to hold off
zealous prosecutors seeking to punish all forms of dishonest behavior. That all European legal systems recognize this distinction is simply of no moment.
The arrogance of the Model Penal Code drafters
overwhelms. The American Law Institute preempts
the role of scholars and theorists by seeking to define
concepts better left to philosophical deliberation. They
ignore all European teaching. They abolish concepts
that crystallized over time in the evolution of the
common law. Yet perhaps it takes arrogance of these
dimensions to create a legal monument of the influence the Model Penal Code commands.
DOGMA IV: PRETEND TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE RULE OF
LAW.

The Model Penal Code makes a strong commitment to the principle nulla poena sine lege in section
1.05(1): 'No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is
a crime or violation under this Code or another statute
of this State." ° Would that it were so.
Just a few provisions later, in section 2.01(3), the
Code provides:
Liability for the commission of an offense may not be
based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless...
(b) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise im19. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).

20. Model Penal Code § 1.05(1).
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posed by law.2 '
This sounds good except that the term "law" in this
provision refers to the case law. The earlier provision
requires definition of all offenses either by the Code or
supplementary statute. There is no reference to the
possibility of common law duties to rescue others in
distress. Had the drafters turned their attention to the
Continent, they would have discovered that French
jurisprudence prohibits this mode of judicial expansion called commission par omission. The French, as
well as virtually all other Continental jurisdictions,
approach the duty to rescue by imposing a special
statutory duty to render aid at the scene of accident.
The violation occurs whether a harmful result ensues
or not. In contrast, the Model Penal Code permits
punishment for murder if the non-rescued victim dies
and the court finds a common law duty to render aid.
To their discredit, German courts also permit conviction for the offense in chief on the basis of a judicially
imposed duty.
The point that amazes me is that there is virtually no discussion in the English language literature
of this breach of rule-of-law values. Even if we continue to violate the principles we purport to endorse,
we should at least be forthright about what we are
doing.
DOGMA V: WREAK THEORETICAL CHANGES,
INADVERTENTLY IF POSSIBLE.

We turn now from general flaws in the Model Penal Code to some specific problems in the drafting of
provisions in the general part. Article III, addressing
the general theory of justification, had brought several
significant changes to the way Americans think about
claims of justification, particularly self-defense. Most
21. Id. § 2.01(3).
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of my comments will focus on section 3.04, which provides:
[Subject to later exceptions], the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the
purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful
force by such other person on the present occasion.
The location and the wording of this provision
raises major theoretical issues. First, coming as it does
after the general provision of lesser evils, section
3.02,23 the Model Penal Code suggests that selfdefense is merely an instantiation of the general
principle that conduct is justified as lesser evils, according to section 3.02(1)(a), which provides that
whenever "the harm or evil sought to be avoided by
such conduct is greater than that sought to be pre24
vented by the law defining the offense charged."
Some people think that this is the correct way of interpreting self-defense, even though in fact it is appropriate to cause much more harm in the act of selfdefense than is threatened against the defender. It is
clearly permissible to kill to avoid a rape. In order to
fit this shared understanding under the principle section 3.02,25 one has to gerrymander the argument by
adding all sorts of interests to the side of the defense,
e.g. the social utility of deterring unlawful aggression.
It is not clear why the Model Penal Code should insist
on interpreting all claims of justification as instances
of lesser evils. Yet for good or ill, the Code has had the
impact of inducing American lawyers to think of selfdefense as a specific application of section 3.02.26 New
York lawyers have even developed the practice of re-

22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. § 3.04(1).
Id. § 3.02.
Id. § 3.02(1)(a).
Id. § 3.02.
Id.

14

BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2:3

ferring to claims of self-defense as the "defense of justification." Before one brings about this kind of theoretical shift, it might be worthwhile to pause and consider whether the shift is sound. I think that it is not.
Second, the drafting of section 3.04 makes the appeal to self-defense dependent on the whether the belief of the actor is "that such force is immediately necessary."2 7 Prior to the Model Penal Code, the general
consensus of Western legal systems was that selfdefense presupposed a subjective requirement of
knowledge and belief in addition to an actual attack
on the defendant. Paul Robinson has argued repeatedly that the actual attack should be sufficient to
ground the defense, but apart from a few isolated aberrations, this view has never prevailed yet in practice. Yet the way the Model Penal Code is drafted, it
appears to go to the extreme precisely the opposite of
Robinson's objectivist approach. According to the language of the provision, all that seems to matter is the
actor's belief.
If everything turns on belief (reasonable belief according to section 3.09),28 then we generate the paradoxical proposition that reasonable belief can justify
conduct. Yet, as just pointed out, the general theory of
justification turns not on subjective considerations but
on the cost/benefit analysis of an actual conflict. The
Model Penal Code cannot have it both ways. It cannot
make the justification contingent on reasonable belief
of lesser evils, and then turn around and require that
the interest spared actually outweigh the interest
sacrificed.
The basic question raised by collapsing the objective and subjective sides of self-defense is whether it
is coherent to claim that belief alone can justify conduct-so far as justification implies that conduct is
right and proper. Kent Greenawalt has argued that
27. Id. § 3.04(1).
28. Id. § 3.09.
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reasonable belief can, in certain situations, justify either self-defense or necessity based on lesser evils.29 I
disagree but we need not rehearse that debate here,
for the wording of section 3.04 seems to imply that belief alone can justify conduct."0 The probleni of unreasonable belief enters the equation as a limitation on
section 3.04, but a limitation applicable only where
negligence can support a conviction for causing harm
under an unreasonable belief in the necessity of selfdefense."' In a case like the Goetz case," where the
charges are attempted murder and battery, negligent
perpetration of these offenses is excluded. Therefore,
under the terms of the Code, even if Goetz's belief that
he was about to be mugged was unreasonable, he was
justified in responding in self-defense. This strikes me
as an implausible view about the nature of justification. I am not addressing here the charge of reckless
endangerment.
In the end, then, the Model Penal Code stands for
a radical and implausible innovation in our thinking
about the nature of justification. Justification turns
out not to be a matter of social reality, as perceived by
the defendant, but solely a matter of the defendant's
beliefs, however irrational. This innovation hardly
invites a convincing rationale.
The third innovation of the Model Penal Code in
the field of self-defense is to drop the traditional requirement of an imminent attack and to replace it
with the defendant's belief that his response is
"immediately necessary... on the present occasion."33
This is a change that turns out to have great practical
significance in cases of self-defense asserted by allegedly battered women after killing a feared partner in
29. Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984).
30. Id. § 3.04.
31. Id.
32. People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986).
33. Model Penal Code § 3.04(1).
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his sleep. There is no sense in which an attack is imminent but the defendant might indeed believe that a
response is "immediately necessary... on the present
occasion."34 The same claim would apply as a basis for
total acquittal in the prosecution of the Menendez
brothers who claimed that they thought that killing
their parents who were then watching television was
"immediately necessary."35 The restriction offered by
the term "present occasion" lends itself to expansive
interpretation.
It is hard to know how deeply the drafters
thought about this radical change in the structure of
self-defense. There is some evidence that they did not
think about it very carefully, for section 3.02 on lesser
evils is also drafted to permit a violation of law without regard to whether the risk to the actor is imminent.36 This seems to be a clear mistake in the drafting, and one typically corrected by the few states that
have adopted a provision like section 3.02." If the
omission represents a careless slip, then the same is
likely to be true of section 3.04.8
The requirement of imminent risk, typically found
in foreign codes and recognized at common law,
stands for an important principle. In the context of
lesser evils, an imminent risk assures that the actor
has no recourse but to violate the law. There is no way
to avoid the harm by appealing to democratic processes. With regard to self-defense, the requirement
provides a line of demarcation between the legitimate
use of force and vigilante style self-help. This is a distinction that should not be scrapped or altered without the most serious reflection. I have my doubts as to
34. Id.
35. People v. Menendez, BAO 68880, 1996 WL 363705 (Cal. Super.
Trans. July 2, 1996); People v. Menedez, BAO 68880, 1996 WL 121110
(Cal. Super. Trans. March 20, 1996); Menendez v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, 834 P.2d 786 (Cal. 1992).
36. Model Penal Code § 3.02.
37. Id.
38. Id. § 3.04.
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whether the changes in the Model Penal Code are informed by deliberations of the required selfconsciousness and depth.
DOGMA VI: PRETEND THAT THE PROBLEM OF MISTAKE
DOES NOT EXIST.

The Model Penal Code tries to push the problem
under the legislative rug. Section 2.04(1)(a) provides
that mistake about an element of an offense is relevant only, in effect, when the culpability factor assigned to the element accommodates the mistake." If
purpose or knowledge is legislatively assigned, then
any mistake, even an unreasonable mistake, will negate the required culpability. If recklessness or negligence is the required mental element, then only reasonable mistakes will suffice. If no state mental is
required for the particular element, then a mistake as
to that element is irrelevant. The logical symmetry is
sufficiently clear. In effect, it eliminates the problem
of mistake as an independent arena of moral and
theoretical inquiry. Read the local statute and you
know how to gauge the impact of mistake.
Of course, the entire approach assumes great legislative wisdom, but the Model Penal Code's own confusions in this area indicate how difficult it is to be
consistently wise in drafting a code. The language of
the Code (material elements of the offense) purports to
include the absence of justification and excuse in the
formula of section 2.04(1)(a):
the ignorance or mistake negatives the purpose, knowledge, belief, recklessness or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense.40
Yet the drafting of the defenses in Articles 2 and 3
does not even come close to the prescribed method of
39. Id. § 2.04(1)(a).
40. Id.
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assigning a culpability level to each element of the defense. To return to the example of self-defense in section 3.04, we learn that the defendant must
(reasonably) believe that the use of force is immediately necessary on the present occasion." He is mistaken if, for example, he thinks that he is being attacked when he is not. If the mistake is unreasonable,
then he risks liability under section 3.09(3).42 Yet the
logic becomes a bit confusing. If this mistake results
in the loss of the justification, it will not be because
the mistake negates the culpability element required
for the offense. Its effect is just the opposite: the mistake establishes the negligence required for liability
for another offense, with the resulting forfeiture of the
justification.
This example informs us that the general formula
of the Model Penal Code is oversimplified. You cannot
simply argue that the problem of mistake is resolved
as soon as you specify the culpability requirements for
the elements of every offense. Mistakes about the circumstances of justification function differently from
mistakes about core elements of the offense. For one,
according to the scheme of the Model Penal Code, the
mistake simply transforms the defendant's state of
mind from knowledge to belief. In itself, this has no effect on the availability of the justification. If the mistake is unreasonable, then it continues to justify the
act but it also generates a basis for charging the justified actor with negligently or recklessly committing a
subsidiary offense. Mistake in the field of justification,
therefore, is a double-edged sword. It has a blunt edge
with regard to the problem of justification and a sharp
edge for generating additional liability.
Mistakes with regard to excusing are equally
complicated. The Model Penal Code seems to be
oblivious to the problem of mistake in making a claim,
41. Id. § 3.04(1).
42. Id. § 3.09(3).

1998]

DOGMAS

say, of duress as a excuse. Section 2.09(1) provides:
It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the
conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was
coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful
force against his person or the person of another, which a
person of reasonable firmness
in his situation would
43
have been unable to resist.
Let us suppose the threat is to kill the actor's
child who is missing, allegedly kidnapped by the
threatener. A person of reasonable firmness would
presumably give in to the threat, at least if the act required were not outrageously costly to human life. But
suppose that the actor thinks that he has received this
threat (he misreads the letter) when in fact he has
not. This is a mistake about the conditions of duress.
Is he still excused if a reasonable person would have
engaged in the same misreading of the letter? The
Model Penal Code fails to supply an answer. It is also
clear that section 2.04(1) has no traction in this case.44
Though the absence of duress is technically "a material element of the offense," the drafters have no answer to the problem.
There are other more serious problems in applying the theory of mistake to the Model Penal Code.
What if the actor thinks that, in line with the defense
created in section 2.04(3), he is proceeding in reliance46
on a "judicial decision" that authorizes his conduct?
In fact, just before his acting, the decision is overruled. Had the decision been in force, his reliance
would have been reasonable and, let us say, his mistake about the existence of the decision is also reasonable. Does it follow that he can act in reasonable reliance on a nonexistent source of law? Again, the Model

43. Id. § 2.09(1).

44. Id. § 2.04(1).
45. Id.
46. Id. § 2.04(3).
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Penal Code does not give us a clue on how to proceed
in this case.
These examples illustrate the theoretical difficulties that haunt the theory of mistake. If the drafters of
the Model Penal Code had been the slightest bit
humble in their theoretical pretensions, they might
have recognized that there were areas of criminal responsibility that they themselves were not in a position to resolve in black letter rules.
The fact is that even today deep problems in the
theory of mistake remain unresolved. One of the nagging issues is the treatment of mistakes about consent
in rape cases. The problem is typified by the shameful
decision in D.P.P. v. Morgan, in which the House of
Lords held that any mistake about whether a protesting women in fact consents to intercourse negates the
intention required for rape and therefore precludes liability." This decision is still followed in England
(despite corrective legislation to the contrary), Canada, Israel, and it expresses the dominant view in the
German theoretical literature.
The basic problems in this case are first, how
should we treat mistakes about factual presuppositions about claims of justification? And second, how
should we classify consent in rape cases? Is it a claim
of justification or is absence of consent properly regarded as a core element of the prosecution's case?
The House of Lords just assumed, without any theoretical reflection, that the required intent in rape encompassed the absence of consent. If this is true, then
it follows that even unreasonable mistakes are a defense to liability. The problem is whether this classification of consent is correct. Though I think it is better
to treat consent as a justification, I concede that
problems attend this view as well.
With regard to the Morgan problem, the Model
Penal Code proves to be inadequate for two reasons.
47. D.P.P. v. Morgan [1976] A.J. 182.
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First, it provides no classificatory or theoretical
treatment of consent at all. Second, if the general
principle of justification based on belief in Article III
were applied, it would lead to an acquittal based on
the simple, possibly irrational belief in consent in rape
cases. Since in the absence of special legislation, negligent rape is not punishable, a negligent or unreasonable mistake about consent would lead to a total
acquittal.
It is clear that the fair and sensible answer in this
area would lead to liability for negligent mistakes
about the consent of a sexual partner. How one generates the theoretical structure to lead to this result remains unsolved. That the problems in this area are so
difficult makes one wonder how the drafters of the
Model Penal Code could believe that the problems did
not exist at all.
DOGMAVII: RECOGNIZE BUT DO NOT RECOGNIZE
MISTAKE OF LAW AS AN EXCUSE.

Our last dogma is a modest complaint. The Model
Penal Code proposes to correct a basic inadequacy in
the common law by recognizing a defense of mistake
of law in section 2.04(3).4' The basic idea is that the
actor has an "affirmative defense" if he has acted in
reasonable reliance on any one of a number of official
sources of listed sources of law. At the conclusion of
the provision we learn that the defendant must prove
this defense without a name by a "preponderance of
the evidence."49 Now why, it is fair to ask, does the
Code shift the burden on this issue but not on selfdefense or duress or insanity?
As a matter of legislative politics, the answer is
that this is a relatively new defense. It is a version of
mistake of law, which was supposed to be a defense at

48. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3).
49. Id. § 2.04(4).
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common law. Recognizing something new, the drafters
understandably thought they should tread carefully
and hedge the new possibility of acquittal by requiring
the defendant to prove the issue.
Does this argument carry as a matter of principle?
The first thing we should try to figure out is why add
this encrustation to a criminal code? Why should
someone by acquitted simply because he acted in reasonable reliance on an official statement of the law?
As Jerome Hall once argued, does this not mean that
he is able to substitute his own opinion of what the
law is for the law itself?
If we look at the location and the drafting of the
provision, we get only minimal clues to the nature of
the claim. The provision appears in Article II rather
than Article III. This means that it is not a justification and that it bears, as the title of Article II indicates, on the "general principles of liability." It is in
the nature of a mistake, and it appears in section 2.04
along with other provisions on mistake." It is something like duress, regulated in section 2.09, also a defense and not a justification.5 ' This is not much to go
on. The basic problem of the Code is that it provides
no conceptual point of contact between its inherent
structure and this provision on reasonable reliance on
official statements of law.
The provision in section 2.04(3) appears to be
something like a gift to the defendant, a gift that can
be compromised by making the defendant pay for it by
bearing the burden of persuasion. 2 The only provision
in the Code in which the drafters shift the burden is
entrapment in section 2.13, a defense that functions
like an exclusionary rule designed to discipline police
for improper behavior." Perhaps the proper interpretation of the reasonable reliance provision is that by
50. Id. § 2.04.

51. Id. § 2.09.
52. Id. § 2.04(3).
53. Id. § 2.13.
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analogy to entrapment, it is designed to discipline
state agencies for issuing misleading statements of
the law. If that is the correct reading, a state legislature might well decide that it is not in the business of
disciplining state agencies and therefore it should be
free to delete provisions so designed.
The better reading of section 2.04(3)," however,
seems to be that a reasonable mistake of law negates
moral culpability for violating the law and no one
should be punished who has acted culpably and
wrongfully and in violation of the statutory law. This
is a relatively simple proposition that has adherents
in all legal systems that follow, more or less, the German model of liability. It even enjoys constitutional
status in Germany, Italy, and to some extent, in Canada. The Model Penal Code's rejection of strict liability for offenses posing a threat of imprisonment shows
that the drafters also understood this basic principle
of justice.
If the drafters had explicitly grounded mistake of
law in its logical relationship to moral culpability,
state legislators would have seen that by eliminating
this provision, they were striking at the heartland of
the Code. It would have been like adopting the Model
Penal Code but striking the provision on insanity or
duress. Of course, if the drafters had clearly recognized that the new defense was simply a natural extension of the requirement of moral culpability, they
would not have been able to shift the burden of persuasion on the issue-at least the contradiction would
have been more apparent.
The unfortunate fate of section 2.04(3)*" instructs
that a sensible design of excusing conditions, including mistake of law, cannot proceed without acknowledging up front that punishment by imprisonment
presupposes morally culpable, wrongful conduct in
54. Id.
55. Id.
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violation of the statutory law. To have done this correctly, the Model Penal Code would have had to avoid
the typical common law mistake of reducing the concept of culpability to subjective mental states, such as
purposely and knowingly committing offenses. But if
the Model Penal Code had been able to recognize the
role of moral culpability in crime, they could have
drafted the problematic definition of unlawfulness in
section 3.11(1)56 more clearly and directly. A simple
definition of excuse as a denial of moral culpability
would have enabled them to say that unlawful force
simply means force that is unjustified but possibly excused.
Now, nearly 30 years after the drafting of the
Model Penal Code, Herbert Wechsler and his innovative colleagues are hardly responsible for the mistakes
that persist in the draft. The responsibility has shifted
to the academic profession that continues to study and
teach the Code. If we repeat the mistakes of the founders, we are the ones who deserve the blame.

56. Id. § 3.11(1).

